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For several years, an increasing number of firms have been investing in Open Source 
Software (OSS). While improvements in such a non-excludable public good cannot be 
appropriated, companies can benefit indirectly in a complementary proprietary segment. We 
study this incentive for investment in OSS. In particular we ask how (1) market entry and (2) 
public investments in the public good affect the firms' production and profits. Surprisingly, 
we find that there exist cases where incumbents benefit from market entry. Moreover, we 
show the counter-intuitive result that public spending does not necessarily lead to a 
decreasing voluntary private contribution. 
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An increasing number of ¯rms, like IBM and Hewlett-Packard or Suse and Red
Hat, have begun to invest in Open Source Software. Open Source Software, such
as Linux, is typically under the General Public License. This license implies that
the software, including any improvement, has to be provided for free. Hence, an
Open Source Software can be seen as a non-excludable public good. Therefore,
¯rms are not able to sell the Open Source Software or their improvements. This
raises the question why companies invest in such a public good.
Lerner and Tirole (2000) argue that ¯rms expect to bene¯t from some market
segment the demand of which is boosted by the improvement of a complementary
Open Source Software. Even though the companies cannot directly capture the
value of an open source program's improvement, they can pro¯t indirectly through
selling more complementary proprietary goods at a potentially higher price.
This incentive to invest in a non-excludable public good does not only arise
in the case of Open Source Software. For example, a similar argument could be
made in the case of advertising that increases the demand of the advertising ¯rm
and at the same time the demand of its competitors. Friedman (1983) calls this
"cooperative advertising". Another example are lobby-activities of a ¯rm that
have a positive e®ect on the whole industry.
In this paper we study the incentive of ¯rms to invest in such a non-excludable
public good. In particular we address the following two questions:
(1) What is the e®ect of a higher public good investment by the government
on the ¯rms' output levels and pro¯ts?
(2) How does market entry a®ect the private incentive to invest in the public
good? Furthermore, how does market entry in°uence the incumbents' pro¯ts?
We contribute to answer the questions (1) and (2) by analyzing a model with
Cournot competition. Firms can produce a private good, and they can invest in
a non-excludable public good in order to enhance its quality. However, they can
only sell the private good. The private good and the public good are complements
for the consumers. An increase in the quality of the public good increases their
2willingness to pay for the private good.
The ¯rst question is particularly interesting because of the ongoing discussion
whether or not the government should support Open Source Software and if so,
how.1 A concern might be that higher government investment in the public good
decreases ¯rms' investments as it is known from the public good literature.2 Hence,
one usually expects a crowding out. Interestingly, such a crowding out does not
have to take place with a complementary public good. We show that it might
occur that the ¯rms' investments increase if the government increases its invest-
ment in the public good. Hence, a crowding in can occur. Thus, it is not obvious
whether the government investment in the public good is a strategic substitute or
complement to the ¯rms' public good investment.
The second question is shortly addressed by Lerner and Tirole (2000). They
argue that the usual free-rider problem might appear because ¯rms are not able
to capture all the bene¯ts of their investments. Therefore, one might argue that
the free-rider problem gets worse with an increasing number of ¯rms. Hence, a
¯rm's investment in the public good decreases with market entry. As we will show
in our model, it might occur that the opposite happens and thus each ¯rm invests
more. Furthermore, we show that market entry of an additional ¯rm has a positive
externality (through the entrant's investment in the public good) and a negative
externality (through the entrant's production of the private good) on the incum-
bents. We ¯nd that for certain cost and demand functions each ¯rm reduces its
private good production and its public good investment when market entry occurs.
In this case incumbents su®er a decrease in pro¯ts and dislike market entry. Sur-
prisingly, for certain cost and demand constellations it is also possible that every
¯rm expands its investment in the public good, combined with a higher private
good output, when market entry occurs. In this case market entry increases the
incumbents' pro¯ts. However, a social planer unambiguously prefers market entry.
This paper is related to the public good literature that is concerned with the
private provision of a non-excludable public good. In standard models of pri-
vate provision of a public good, households can buy the private good, they can
1See e.g. Hahn (2002), Evans and Reddy (2003) or Schmidt and Schnitzer (2002).
2e.g Bergstrom et al. (1986)
3contribute to the public good, and they face a budget constraint.3 A household
receives utility directly from the consumption of both goods and has to decide how
to allocate his budget between the two goods. This setup di®ers from our model.
We consider agents that have no direct bene¯t from the public good. The ¯rms
produce the public good solely due to the complementarity. Furthermore, ¯rms
face no budget constraint.
A second strand of literature our paper is related to is the literature on Mul-
timarket Oligopoly. Bulow et al. (1985) analyze the spillovers of a change in
one market environment on the related markets. In contrast to their model, in
our model the markets are not related via the production technology, but via the
demand function. Bulow et al. (1985) address this issue, but do not formalize
it. They mention that ¯rms have to take care of cross-e®ects in making marginal
revenue calculations. Moreover, ¯rms have to consider the strategic e®ects of their
actions in one market on the competitors' actions in a second market. In our
model we extend this setup to the case of a non-excludable public good. This
is in contrast to the model of Bulow et al. (1985) where only private goods are
considered.
Becker and Murphy (1993) analyze a model in which advertisement and an ad-
vertised good enter the utility function of the households. Advertisement has the
property that it rises the willingness to pay for the advertised good. Hence, it is
complementary to the advertised good from an economic point of view. Neverthe-
less, a ¯rm's advertisement is only complementary to its own private good in their
setup. By contrast, in our model it is also complementary to their competitors'
private good.
Friedman (1983) considers, as a special case, cooperative advertising in a dy-
namic setup. He models advertising like capital in such a way that a ¯rm can use
advertising to build up a "goodwill stock". The ¯rms have to decide how much
to spend on advertising and how to allocate these spendings over time. By using
"a symmetric quadratic model", he shows that an increasing number of active
¯rms leads to a steady-state in which conventional competitive e®ects dominate.
3See e.g. Bergstrom et al. (1986) for a general approach and e.g Bitzer and SchrÄ oder (2002) or Johnson
(2002) for an application to Open Source Software.
4Hence, prices converge to marginal costs. In contrast, we look at a static game to
concentrate explicitly on the externalities between the ¯rms. As we will see, this
leads to di®erent results.
We will proceed as follows. In the next section we set up the model. In Section
3 we look at the properties of the market equilibrium. In Section 4 we analyze
the consequences of a government investment in the public good. In Section 5 we
consider the e®ects of market entry. The ¯nal section concludes.
2 The Model
We assume that ¯rms are engaged in a one-period Cournot competition. They
decide simultaneously about their private good production and their investment
in the public good, taking as given the competitors' production and investment.
We denote by xi (xi 2 [0;xi]) the ¯rm i's (i 2 f1;:::;Ng) production of the
homogenous private good. By yi (yi 2 [0;yi]) we denote the ¯rm i's investment
in the homogenous non-excludable public good. Such an investment increases
the quality of the public good linearly Y =
PN
i=1 yi.4 The private good and the
public good are complements for the consumers. Their willingness to pay for the
private good is increasing in the quality of the public good and hence in the ¯rms'
public good investments. For an illustration consider a computer server (=the
private good) and an Open Source Software (=the public good). The performance
of the server depends crucially on the ability of the server operating system to
use the power of the hardware. If the quality of the operating system increases,
then the consumers' willingness to pay for the server increases due to the better
performance. This yields the following private good demand function
p = p(xi;yi;X¡i;Y¡i); (1)
@p
@xi
< 0; 8i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng; (2)
@p
@yi
> 0; 8i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng: (3)
4Throughout this paper we speak about quality of the public good. In some cases, like advertising,
one can interpret this quality as a measure of quantity.
5We denote by X¡i =
PN
j=1;j6=i xj the other ¯rms' production of the private
good. By Y¡i =
PN
j=1;j6=i yj we denote the other ¯rms' investment in the public
good.
Furthermore, we have the following revenue function of ¯rm i
Ri(xi;yi;X¡i;Y¡i) = xip(xi;yi;X¡i;Y¡i) (4)
and the following pro¯t function
¼i = Ri(xi;yi;X¡i;Y¡i) ¡ Kx(xi) ¡ K
y
i (yi): (5)
We denote by Kx(xi) the private good cost function. For simplicity, we assume
that this cost function is the same for all ¯rms. We assume that ¯rm i has to incur
the costs K
y
i (yi) for investing yi in the public good. Hence, we call this function
"public good cost function". Furthermore, we assume that the public good cost
function can be di®erent for di®erent ¯rms.
In order to have a well de¯ned maximization problem, we assume that the
pro¯t function ¼i is continuous and strictly concave in xi and yi. The following
conditions, satis¯ed for all (xi;yi), yield a Hessian matrix that is everywhere neg-



































· 0 is su±cient for a strictly concave
revenue function.
In order to satisfy Condition 2, we assume a concave revenue function and a
convex public good cost function, with at least one strict, because subtracting a
convex (strictly convex) function from a strictly concave (concave) function yields
a strictly concave function.
@2R






¸ 0, at least one strict. (9)




· 0 yields a strictly concave
pro¯t function if the public good cost function is strictly convex.



















































The stationary point does not have to be a maximum without this technical
assumption.
3 Market Equilibrium
In this section we solve the game and determine the three di®erent kinds of market
equilibria. We show that a unique equilibrium can exist if the marginal costs of
the public good are increasing. In contrast, a multiplicity of equilibria may arise
if the marginal costs of the public good are constant.
We start with the case of increasing marginal costs of the public good.
7Proposition 1. Suppose that the public good's marginal costs are increasing.




of the private good and invest y¤ = (y¤
1;y¤
2;:::;y¤












































In order to see the intuition behind Proposition 1, we write down ¯rm i's pro¯t
function
¼i = xip(xi;X¡i;yi;Y¡i) ¡ Kx(xi) ¡ K
y
i (yi): (14)
Pro¯t maximization yields the following ¯rst order conditions
@¼i
@xi


















Equation (15) displays the standard optimality condition. It says that the
marginal costs of the private good have to be equal to the marginal revenue of
the private good. Equation (16) shows that the investment in the public good has
only an indirect e®ect on the pro¯t. If the public good's quality increases, then the
consumers' willingness to pay increases. This rises the price of the private good.
Therefore, the revenue of ¯rm i increases.
Proposition 1 states that there is a unique Nash Equilibrium x¤ and y¤. From
the Equations (15) and (16) we see that the production of the private good can
8reinforce the incentive to invest in the public good and vice versa. In order to
illustrate this, consider an increase in the private good production of ¯rm i. This
increases the incentive to invest in the public good. A higher public good invest-
ment increases the price of the private good. Compared to the situation with
a lower private good production, this price increase works on more private good
units. Hence, for a ¯rm it gets more attractive to invest in the public good if its
private good production increases.5
At the same time, a higher public good investment also increases the incentives
to produce the private good. The public good investment leads to a higher price
of the private good because it increases the consumers' willingness to pay. There-
fore, selling an additional unit gets more attractive because a ¯rm earns a higher
price out of the additional unit sold.6 But once again, this higher output level
can yield a higher incentive to invest in the public good. Hence, the incentives to
produce the private good and to invest in the public good can reinforce each other.
Conditions 1-3 ensure that this described process converges to a unique max-
imum for each ¯rm if one takes the production and investment of the other ¯rms
as given. In order to determine the Nash-Equilibrium, we additionally have to
take into account that the investment of a ¯rm in the public good increases the
incentive to produce the private good for all other ¯rms. This may increase the
other ¯rms' incentive to invest in the public good and so on.
The two technical assumptions of Proposition 1 guarantee a unique Nash-
Equilibrium (x¤;y¤) by ensuring a contraction mapping of the best response func-
tions. Hence, the equilibrium (x¤;y¤) is globally stable and therefore unique.
In the two next propositions we consider constant marginal costs of the public
good. We show that a multiplicity of equilibria or an asymmetric equilibrium
arises.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the public good's marginal costs are constant and
5Of course, this is only true if the e®ect of the cross derivative
@2p
@xi@yi does not work in the opposite
direction and dominates.
6Of course, as above, this is only true if the e®ect from the cross derivative
@2p
@xi@yi does not work in
the opposite direction and dominates.
9equal for all ¯rms. There are an in¯nite number of equilibria. In all equilibria
x¤
i is the same and the ¯rms' investment in the public good always sums up to a

























In contrast to Proposition 1, Proposition 2 states that all public good invest-
ment vectors y = (y1;:::;yN) that sum up to Y ¤ =
PN
i=1 yi are Nash-Equilibria. In
the previous case the individual investment level y¤
i was determined by the increas-
ing marginal costs. If these are constant, then a coordination problem between
the ¯rms occurs. For an illustration suppose two ¯rms that produce the same
quantities of the private good. Suppose that ¯rm 1 assumes that ¯rm 2 invests
nothing in the public good. Then ¯rm 1 should invest until its marginal revenue
of the public good is equal to its marginal costs. Given this investment of ¯rm 1,
¯rm 2 should invest nothing because its marginal revenue and its marginal costs
are the same as for ¯rm 1. Generally, if ¯rm 1 is in an optimum given to the
investment of ¯rm 2, then ¯rm 2 is also in an optimum given to the investment of
¯rm 1. This fact yields the in¯nite number of possible equilibria.7
In the next proposition we show the properties of an asymmetric equilibrium.
For simplicity, we only address the case of two ¯rms fi;¡ig. A generalization to
N ¯rms is straightforward.
Proposition 3. Suppose that ¯rm i's constant marginal costs for investing in the











In the unique Nash Equilibrium both ¯rms produce the same quantity of the
private good (x¤
i = x¤
¡i) and only ¯rm i invests in the public good (y¤
i = Y ¤;y¤
¡i =
0) if the following condition is ful¯lled
7The technical assumption in Proposition 2 ensures that the best response functions with respect to
























In the following we ¯rst check whether the described equilibrium is indeed an
equilibrium. Afterwards, we show that this equilibrium is unique.
Suppose that the ¯rms choose (x¤
i = x¤
¡i;y¤
i = Y ¤;y¤
¡i = 0). With respect to
the private good we know that the marginal costs of i and ¡i are equal at the
point x¤
i = x¤
¡i. What can we say about the marginal revenues? With respect to
the marginal revenue of the private good we know that it does not matter whether
¯rm i or ¡i invests in the public good. Only the resulting quality of the public
good Y = yi + y¡i is important. Therefore, the marginal revenue with respect to
the private good is the same for both ¯rms. Thus, both ¯rms produce the same
quantity of the private good.
Furthermore, suppose that ¯rm i's optimal response to y¤
¡i = 0 is y¤
i = Y ¤
given x¤
i = x¤
¡i. This is an equilibrium if ¯rm ¡i has no incentive to deviate from
y¤














Furthermore, we know that the marginal revenue with respect to the public
good is the same for both ¯rms with x¤
i = x¤
¡i. Hence, if ¯rm ¡i has higher














Therefore, it is indeed optimal for ¯rm ¡i to choose y¡i = 0. Hence, x¤
i =
x¤
¡i;yi = Y ¤;y¡i = 0 is an equilibrium.
11Uniqueness follows from the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.8
Assume that ¯rm i invests nothing (yi = 0) and denote the best response of ¯rm
¡i as e y¡i jyi=0. This is the maximal value of y¡i that makes sense for ¯rm ¡i
because if yi > 0, then it follows e y¡i jyi>0< e y¡i jyi=0. Hence, all y¡i > e y¡i jyi=0
are strictly dominated by ya
¡i = e y¡i jyi=0. Given this, the smallest yi that ¯rm i
should choose is e yi jya
¡i. This is the best response to ya
¡i. Hence, all yi < e yi jya
¡i
are strictly dominated by ya
i = e yi jya
¡i. Given this, ¯rm ¡i should maximal invest
e y¡i jya
i < ya
¡i. Hence, all y¡i > e y¡i jya
i are strictly dominated by e y¡i jya
i = yb
¡i. It is
obvious that this process converges to the unique equilibrium where yi = Y ¤ and
y¡i = 0.
4 Government Intervention
Let us now consider the e®ects of government intervention. Assume that the gov-
ernment starts to invest or changes its investment in the public good. This is not
a hypothetical assumption as one can see from the direct US Government support
for Linux. For example, the US government decided to ¯nance a research project
at a university to improve Linux (Evans and Reddy (2003)). In the following we
assume that the government can invest directly in the public good as the ¯rms.
By yG we denote the investment of the government in the public good.
If the government increases its investment in the public good, one usually ex-
pects a crowding out in such a way that the ¯rms decrease their investment in the
public good. At least, this is what the standard public good literature states in the
context of households.9 In these models households have a certain budget. They
have to decide how to allocate their budget between a private and a public good.
In an interior equilibrium each household splits up his budget in such a way that
his marginal utility of the private good is equal to his marginal utility of the public
good. Suppose that the government increases its public good investment. Usually
this decreases the marginal utility of the public good. Therefore, households shift
money from the investment in the public good to the consumption of the private
good in such a way that the marginal utilities are again equal. Thus, a crowding
8Uniqueness of x¤
i = x¤
¡i follows from the technical condition in the Proposition 3. This yields that
the best response functions with respect to the private good are a contracting mapping.
9see e.g. Bergstrom et.al. (1985)
12out occurs.
In this section we show that such a crowding out does not have to occur in our
setup. Instead, a crowding in is possible.10 Thus, a higher government investment
in the public good can yield a higher investment of the ¯rms in the public good.
In order to understand how the government investment in°uences the incentive
of a ¯rm to invest in the public good, we have to distinguish between direct and
indirect e®ects. Therefore, we take the total derivative of the ¯rst order conditions:








































Total derivative of @¼i
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dxj and dY¡i =
N X
j=1;i6=j
dyj + dyG: (24)
10Because one can consider several di®erent cases, we restrict our attention to only two examples which
highlight the possible outcomes.
13Equation (22) and (23) illustrate the decomposition into direct and indirect
e®ects.
1. The direct e®ect in°uences xi (yi) by a change in X¡i and Y¡i without depend-
ing on a change in the corresponding complement yi (xi).
2. The indirect e®ect in°uences the optimal level of xi (yi) by a change in the
corresponding complement yi (xi).
For an illustration, suppose that IBM, a producer of hardware like computer
servers, faces an exogenous increase in the quality of the complementary public
good Linux. For example, IBM learns that the government ¯nances a research
project at a university in order to improve Linux. We denote this by dyG > 0.
How does this exogenous shock in°uences IBM's incentives to produce the private
good and to invest in the public good? On the one hand, the government invest-
ment in the public good increases the consumers' valuation of IBM's hardware.
This gives IBM an incentive to increase its production of the hardware (= a direct
e®ect of dY¡i on dxi). On the other hand, the additional public good investment
may decrease IBM's incentive to invest in the public good because keeping the old
investment level leads to an ine±cient high quality of the public good from IBM's
point of view (= a direct e®ect of dY¡i on dyi). Furthermore, indirect e®ects
appear. If IBM produces more servers, this changes its incentive to invest in the
public good Linux (=indirect e®ect of dxi on dyi). Additionally, if IBM changes
its investment in Linux, the quality of Linux changes. This has an e®ect on IBM's
incentive to produce the private good (= indirect e®ect of dyi on dxi).
As we show in the following proposition, these direct and indirect e®ects can
yield a crowding in.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the government increases its public good investment
dyG > 0. Each ¯rm increases its private good production and its public good
investment if
















The ¯rms are in an equilibrium before the government changes its investment.
In this equilibrium the marginal costs of the public good are equal to the marginal
revenue of the public good. If the government increases its investment in the public





= 0). Therefore, the ¯rms have no direct incentive to adjust their investment
in the public good. Nevertheless, if the quality of the public good increases, then
the ¯rms have an incentive to increase their production of the private good (=di-
rect e®ect) because the private good's price increases. This higher private good
output has a feedback-e®ect (= indirect e®ect) on the incentives to invest in the
public good. A ¯rm's marginal revenue of the public good increases if the ¯rm
produces more of the private good. Finally, the investment of the government
yields a higher public good investment of the ¯rms. Hence, no crowding out, but
a crowding in occurs. Furthermore, the total supply of the private good increases.
As a second case we consider the opposite to a crowding in. We show that
a total crowding out might occur. Hence, ¯rms reduce their investment in the
public good in such a way that the quality of the public good remains constant.
In addition, this yields no change in the private good production.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the government increases its public good investment
dyG. Each ¯rm does not change its private good production and the public good
investment of the ¯rms gets adjusted in such a way that a total crowding out occurs
PN
i=1 dyi = ¡dyG if












² the change in the government investment is not higher then the total invest-




Proof. From Proposition 2 and 3 we know that the investment in the public good
has always to sum up to Y ¤ with constant marginal costs. The last condition
ensures that the ¯rms' new optimal investment level remains non-negative.
15Given constant marginal costs and a decreasing marginal revenue of the public
good, there exists an intersection where marginal revenue is equal to marginal
costs. This point determines the individually optimal investment level in the public
good. If the government increases its investment in the public good, then the
marginal costs are higher than the marginal revenue because the marginal revenue
decreases. Therefore, the ¯rms have an incentive to decrease their investment
in the public good. They should decrease their investment until the marginal
costs are again equal to marginal revenue. This is achieved by a total crowding
out. Finally, the quality of the public good does not change. This leads to no
adjustment of the private good production. From a welfare point of view, the
consumers do not bene¯t from the government intervention. Only the ¯rms are
better o®. They invest less in the public good. Nevertheless, they get the same
price for their proprietary product as before. In this case the investment of the
government only increases the pro¯ts of the ¯rms. The government investment has
neither an impact on the ¯rms' production of the private good nor on the quality
of the public good.
5 Market Entry
Let us now turn to the e®ects of market entry. In the last section we have assumed
that the ¯rms face a given exogenous shock with respect to the quality of the public
good. Given market entry, the dimension of this shock is determined endogenously.
Furthermore, market entry changes the total supply of the private good. Therefore,
we use a linear-quadratic framework to solve this game analytically. Hence, we
use the following inverse demand function
p = A ¡ bX + cY: (25)
In this function b and c represent weight factors. They determine the impact of
the private good and the impact of the public good on the market price. One can
easily derive such a demand function from the following maximization problem of
a representative consumer
max
x;z U = (A + cy)x ¡
1
2
bx2 + z s.t. z + xp = m : (26)






The parameters d and f represent the weight of the cost functions in the pro¯t
function.
In the following we introduce Lemma 1 to ensure an interior solution of this
game.
Lemma 1. There exists a unique Nash Equilibrium (x¤;y¤) where each ¯rm
chooses the same x¤
i and y¤
i if the following conditions are ful¯lled:
Case 1: If f ¸ c2






Case 2: If f < c2





The conditions in Lemma 1 are always easily to ful¯ll because one can ¯nd
a su±ciently high d for each value of N. Intuitively, Lemma 1 ensures that the
¯rms' best reply functions are a contraction mapping. This is the case if the costs
of the private good have enough weight, so d is high enough.
To ¯nd the optimal values (x¤
i;y¤
i ), we write down the pro¯t function of a ¯rm
i. We denote by xj and yj the production of ¯rm j 2 f1;:::;Ng n i
¼i = xi(A ¡ bxi ¡ (N ¡ 1)bxj + cyi + (N ¡ 1)cyj) ¡ dx2
i ¡ fy2
i : (29)
The ¯rst-order conditions are
@¼i
@xi
= A ¡ 2bxi ¡ (N ¡ 1)bxj + cyi + (N ¡ 1)cyj ¡ 2dxi = 0; (30)
@¼i
@yi
= cxi ¡ 2fyi = 0: (31)







Equation (32) shows that y¤
i depends on the ¯rm's own production of the
private good, on the weight of the public good cost function f, and on the impact
of the public good on the price. Therefore, the optimal level of y¤
i is independent
of the production of the other ¯rms and changes only if x¤
i changes. This follows
from the fact that the cross derivative of the price is zero. We summarize this
observation in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. A ¯rm i's optimal public good investment y¤







Intuitively, a ¯rm's public good investment increases the private good's price.
The e®ect of yi on p is constant and equal to c. Therefore, the marginal revenue
of yi is cxi. The marginal costs are 2fyi. The marginal revenue has to be equal
to the marginal costs in the optimum. We see that the relationship between xi
and yi is linear and the constant slope depends on the weight of the public good's
production cost f and on the impact of yi on p.
In a next step we determine ¯rm i's optimal private good supply. Solving (30)
for x¤





b(1 + N) ¡ c2
2fN + 2d
: (33)
After deriving the ¯rms' optimal production and investment levels, we consider
how these change due to market entry. Suppose that an additional ¯rm enters the
market that has access to the same technology as the incumbents. Hence, it can
invest in the public good and it can produce the private good. The new ¯rm's
production of the private good and its investment in the public good leads to two
e®ects. On the one hand, the price decreases because competition in the private
good market gets tougher. This decreases the incentives to produce xi. On the
18other hand, the entrant's investment in the public good increases the consumers'
valuation of the private good. This yields an incentive to increase the production
of the private good. Hence, it is not obvious whether an incumbent increases or
decreases its production of the private good.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the number of competing ¯rms increases.
² If the weight of the public good's production costs is relatively high (f > c2
2b),
then each incumbent reduces its production x¤
i and investment y¤
i .
² If the weight of the public good's production costs is relatively low (f < c2
2b),
then each incumbent increases its production x¤
i and investment y¤
i .
If f = c2




Proof. To prove Proposition 6 we take the ¯rst derivative of x¤
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@N is negative if f > c2
2b, is zero if c2
2b, and is positive if f < c2
2b.
Furthermore, from Lemma 2 follows that y¤
i changes in the same direction as
x¤
i.
If the weight of the public good cost function is small (f < c2
2b) then, in equi-
librium, the entrant invests so much in the public good that it makes up for its
negative pecuniary externality. This leads to an increase in the price. The increase
in the price yields a higher incentive to produce the private good. It directly fol-
lows that the ¯rms increase their public good investment, too (Lemma 2). If the
weight of the public good cost function is high (f > c2
2b), then the opposite is true.
Let us now consider the total supply of the private good X¤ and the quality of
the public good Y ¤. By taking the derivative with respect to N, we see that X¤
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> 0 (Lemma 2) (35)
We see that the entrant's production is always high enough to make up for
a possible decline in the incumbents' production and investment. Hence, if the
number of ¯rms increases, then the total production of the private good and the
quality of the public good increases. However, even if the total supply of the
private good always increases in N, the market price does not have to decrease.
Hence, counter-intuitively, market entry can increase the price of the private good.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the number of competing ¯rms increases.
² If the weight of the public good's production costs is relatively high (f > c2
2b),
then the price p decreases.
² If the weight of the public good's production costs is relatively low (f < c2
2b),
then the price p increases.
If f = c2
2b, then the price does not change.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, we know that an increase in the private good production decreases
the price and that a higher investment level in the public good increases the price.
Hence, it depends on the dimension of the two e®ects whether the price increases
or decreases. If the weight of the public good cost function is relatively low, then
the ¯rms invest so much in the public good that the price increases. If weight of
the public good cost function is relatively high, then the opposite is true.
Let us now consider the ¯rms' pro¯ts. We know that in a "normal" Cournot-
Game, i.e. without a public good, incumbents dislike market entry because the
entrant has a negative pecuniary externality. In contrast, in our setup the entrant
has also a positive pecuniary externality by investing in the public good. Hence,
it is not obvious whether the negative or positive e®ect dominates.
20Proposition 8. Suppose that the number of competing ¯rms increases.
² If the weight of the public good's production costs is relatively high (f > c2
2b),
then the pro¯ts of the incumbents decrease.
² If the weight of the public good's production costs is relatively low (f < c2
2b),
then the pro¯ts of the incumbents increase.
If f = c2
2b, then the pro¯ts of the incumbents do not change.
Proof. See Appendix.
We know from Proposition 6 that market entry reduces each ¯rm's production
and investment if the weight of the public good cost function is high (f > c2
2b).
Furthermore, the price decreases. Hence, it is obvious that the pro¯ts of the in-
cumbents decrease. This is in line with the usual e®ect of tougher competition. If
f < c2
2b, we get the surprising result that the incumbents prefer more competition.
This is due to the fact that the entrant does not only produce the private good,
but also invests in the public good. Hence, the entrant has a positive and negative
externality on the incumbents. If the weight of the public good cost function is
small, the positive external e®ect dominates the negative one.
Usually higher market prices and higher pro¯ts are indices for a lower con-
sumer surplus and a lower social welfare. Hence, one might think that welfare
reacts ambiguously to market entry due to the fact that the price and the pro¯ts
can increase with market entry. Nevertheless, we show that market entry unam-
biguously increases social welfare.
Proposition 9. If the number of competing ¯rms increases, then the social welfare
increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
If we consider the consumer surplus, we see that it increases in N. This is
due to two e®ects. Firstly, the quality of the public good increases if market entry
occurs. This leads to a higher private good valuation, which has a positive e®ect
on the consumer surplus. Secondly, market entry leads to tougher competition in
the proprietary sector. This increases the supply and has again a positive e®ect
on the consumer surplus. Thus, even if the market entry leads to higher prices, we
21get a higher consumer surplus. Proposition 8 shows that market entry increases
the pro¯ts of the ¯rms if the public good's production costs have a low weight.
Hence, social welfare increases. If the ¯rms' pro¯ts decrease with market entry,
the gain in the consumer surplus dominates. Therefore, market entry is always
welfare enhancing.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the incentive to invest in a non-excludable public
good that is complementary to a private good. We have shown that an increase of
the government investment in the public good leads to ambiguous results. Firms
may decrease their investment and a crowding out may occur. In this case the
government investment is a strategic substitute to the investment of the ¯rms.
However, it is also possible that it is a strategic complement. Hence, ¯rms may
invest more in the public good if the government increases its public good invest-
ment. This leads to the following policy implication: If a government thinks about
supporting Open Source Software by directly investing, then the concern that a
crowding out occurs can be without any reason. Exactly the opposite can be true.
The government investment can induce the ¯rms to increase their investment in
the public good and to increase their private good supply. Furthermore, we have
considered market entry. We have shown that an entrant has positive and negative
pecuniary externalities on the incumbents. Therefore, market entry can increase
the pro¯ts of the incumbents.
Our analysis sheds new light on the incentives to license a proprietary product
to horizontal competitors. Usually it is argued that licensing gives incumbents a
commitment device to higher quality or, in network industries, to a bigger network
by inducing competition. This results in an overall higher demand and o®sets the
loss in market power.11 Another argument arises from our paper. A ¯rm can
use licensing to induce market entry. The incumbent anticipates that the entrant
does not only produce the private good, but also invests in public goods like e.g.
cooperative advertising. This public good investment can make up for the tougher
competition in the proprietary sector. Hence, it may increase the incumbent's
11See e.g. Shepard (1987) and Economides (1997).
22pro¯t.
In this context, we would highlight the advertising campaign of Apple in the
year 1981 as an example of such a "warm welcome" of competition. Apple Com-
puter had responded to the entry of IBM in the PC Market with full-page news-
paper advertisements, "Welcome IBM. Seriously."(See Figure 1). In these adver-
tisements Apple claims that there will be a huge market as soon as the people
understand the value of a PC. It seems that Apple thought that IBM will help
them to convince people, "We look forward to responsible competition in the mas-
sive e®ort to distribute this American technology to the world". This is in line
with our argumentation if one interprets the meaning of "responsible competi-
tion" as helping to convince people, and not as selling only proprietary products.
Hence, IBM takes part in the private provision of the non-excludable public good
"knowledge" or "awareness".
23Figure 1: Advertisement of Apple
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We proceed in two steps. Firstly, we prove existence. Secondly, we show
uniqueness.
1. Existence:
Given xi 2 [0;xi] and yi 2 [0;yi], it follows that the strategy spaces are
nonempty compact convex subsets of R2. Furthermore, by assumption, the pro¯t
function is continuous. Given a strictly concave pro¯t function, it follows directly
that the pro¯t functions satisfy the quasi-concavity criteria. It follows that there
24exists a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (Debreu (1952)).
2. Uniqueness
To show uniqueness we apply the contraction mapping approach. Due to Bert-
sekas (1999) it is su±cient to show that the Hessian of the pro¯t functions ful¯lls


















































































































































































































































































Proof of Proposition 2
We proceed in two steps. Firstly, we prove existence. Secondly, we show a
multiplicity of equilibria.
1. Existence
See ¯rst part of the proof of Proposition 1.
2. Multiplicity
We proceed in 4 steps:
Step 1:
Due to the ¯rst technical assumption in the Proposition 2, we have a contraction
mapping of the best reply functions with respect to the private good. This leads





By the proof of existence, we know that there exists at least one Nash Equilibrium












is a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies.
Step 3:
We de¯ne y0
j = yj + ¹ and y0
k = yk ¡ ¹ with ¹ 6= 0.






















If this is the case, then these ¯rst order conditions are also ful¯lled with the











This is the case because Y =
PN
i=1 yi does not change. The marginal costs of
yi are always constant and the same for all ¯rms. Furthermore, the ¯rms' marginal





This leads to the conclusion that all ¯rst order conditions are ful¯lled at s0.
Step 4:
Now one can go back to Step 3 and repeat the procedure with s0 instead of s¤.
By repeating Step 3 and 4 it is obvious that there exist an in¯nite number of
equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 3
Firstly, we prove that the described equilibrium is indeed a Nash Equilibrium.




¡i;yi = Y ¤;y¤
¡i = 0) an equilibrium?
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Given x¤
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¡i;yi = Y ¤;y¤
¡i = 0) is an equilibrium.
Next, we rule out all other possible equilibria to show uniqueness. Firstly, we










































@yi@y¡i = 0 it is true that
dyi = ¡dy¡i:
Secondly, we solve the game by iterated deletion of strictly dominated strate-
gies. We denote by y¤








@y¡i , it follows that y¤
¡i jyi=0< y¤
i jy¡i=0.
Hence, ¯rm i knows that ¯rm ¡i never chooses a higher y¡i than y¤
¡i jyi=0= ymax
¡i .




Hence, ¯rm ¡i knows that ¯rm i never invests less than ymin
i .




Hence, ¯rm i knows that ¯rm ¡i never chooses a higher y¡i than ymax0
¡i .




28Continuing, one sees that in the limit ymin
i converges to y¤
i jy¡i=0 and ymax
¡i con-








Proof of Proposition 4
For the proof we proceed in two steps. Firstly, we show that @xi
@yG > 0. Sec-
ondly, we prove that
@yi
@yG > 0.




















@f1=@yG @f1=@y1 @f1=@x2 @f1=@y2 ::: ::: @f1=@xN¡1 @f1=@yN¡1 @f1=@xN @f1=@yN
@g1=@yG @g1=@y1 @g1=@x2 @g1=@y2 ::: ::: @g1=@xN¡1 @g1=@yN¡1 @g1=@xN @g1=@yN
@f2=@yG @f2=@y1 @f2=@x2 @f2=@y2 ::: ::: @f2=@xN¡1 @f2=@yN¡1 @f2=@xN @f2=@yN
@g2=@yG @g2=@y1 @g2=@x2 @g2=@y2 ::: ::: @g2=@xN¡1 @f4=@yN¡1 @g2=@xN @g2=@yN
: : : : : : : : : :
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where fi = @¼i
@xi for i 2 f1;2;3;:::;Ng and gi = @¼i
@yi for i 2 f1;2;3;:::;Ng.







29we show that the numerator and denominator are positive.
1.1 jDxj > 0




= ¡a 8i 2 f1;2;3;:::;Ng
@fi
@yw
= a 8i 2 f1;2;3;:::;Ng;8w 2 f1;2;3;:::;Ng
@fi
@xz
= c 8i 2 f1;2;3;:::;Ng;8z 2 f1;2;3;:::;Ng n i
@fi
@xi
= e 8i 2 f1;2;3;:::;Ng
@gi
@yG
= 0 8i 2 f1;2;3:::;Ng
@gi
@yi
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¡a a c a c a ::: ::: c a c a
0 b d 0 d 0 ::: ::: d 0 d 0
¡a a e a c a ::: ::: c a c a
0 0 a b d 0 ::: ::: d 0 d 0
¡a a c a e a ::: ::: c a c a
0 0 d 0 a b ::: ::: d 0 d 0
: : : : : : : : : : : :
: : : : : : : : : : : :
¡a a c a c a ::: ::: e a c a
0 0 d 0 d 0 ::: ::: a b d 0
¡a a c a c a ::: ::: c a e a
























¡a a c a c a ::: ::: c a c a
0 b d 0 d 0 ::: ::: d 0 d 0
0 0 e ¡ c 0 0 0 ::: ::: 0 0 0 0
0 0 a b d 0 ::: ::: d 0 d 0
0 0 0 0 e ¡ c 0 ::: ::: 0 0 0 0
0 0 d 0 a b ::: ::: d 0 d 0
: : : : : : : : : : : :
: : : : : : : : : : : :
0 0 0 0 0 0 ::: ::: e ¡ c 0 0 0
0 0 d 0 d 0 ::: ::: a b d 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ::: ::: 0 0 e ¡ c 0












One sees that there exists a line z (z 2 f3;5;7;:::Ng) where only the element













¡a a c a c a ::: ::: c a c a
0 b 0 0 d 0 ::: ::: d 0 d 0
0 0 e ¡ c 0 0 0 ::: ::: 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 b d 0 ::: ::: d 0 d 0
0 0 0 0 e ¡ c 0 ::: ::: 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 b ::: ::: d 0 d 0
: : : : : : : : : : : :
: : : : : : : : : : : :
0 0 0 0 0 0 ::: ::: e ¡ c 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ::: ::: 0 b d 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ::: ::: 0 0 e ¡ c 0












Hence, the Determinant is


























































Therefore if follows jDxj > 0 8 N.
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We know that this matrix is diagonally dominant. Furthermore, if a matrix
is diagonal dominant and its diagonal elements are positive, then the matrix is
positive de¯nite. On the diagonal, there are the second-order conditions that are
all negative. Through multiplying every line by (¡1) one gets positive diagonal
elements and through the odd number of lines a scalar of +1. This gives a positive
de¯nite matrix. Therefore, the determinant has to be positive.
2.
Total derivative of @¼i
@yi:

































32One sees that the direct e®ect of dY¡i is zero. The direct e®ect of dX¡i is
non-negative. The indirect e®ect of dxi is positive. Therefore, yi has to increase
to ensure that @¼i
@yi remains zero.
Proof of Lemma 1
The existence of a Nash-Equilibrium in pure strategies follows immediately
from Proposition 1. For the uniqueness we apply the contraction mapping princi-
ple. Beforehand, we reduce the strategy space form R2 to R because yi is directly










Plugging back into the pro¯t function of ¯rm i yields
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(N ¡ 1) j ¡b +
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If f ¸ c2
2b, then ¡b + c2
2f · 0. Therefore:
(1 ¡ N)(¡b +
c2
2f








33If f < c2
2b, then ¡b + c2
2f > 0. Therefore:
(N ¡ 1)(¡b +
c2
2f







Proof of Proposition 7
For the proof we use the fact that yi = c
2fxi (32) and rewrite the demand
function (25) as follows:
p = A ¡ bX + cY = A ¡ bX(N) + c
c
2f




p = A + N ¤
A
b(1 + N) ¡ 1
2
c2
















[b(1 + N) ¡ 1
2
c2








@N = 0 if f = c2
2b ! p = A
²
@p
@N > 0 if f < c2
2b
Proof of Proposition 8
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2f)(¡2b ¡ 2d + c2
2f)
³
b(1 + N) ¡ c2
2fN + 2d
´3
The last term (¡2b¡2d+ c2
2f) is always negative due to the second order conditions.
Therefore, we have to look at b ¡ c2
2f and at the denominator.
Case 1: f = c2
2b
Then b ¡ c2
2f = 0 and therefore @¼
@N = 0.
Case 2: f > c2
2b
Then b ¡ c2
2f > 0 and the sign of @¼
@N depends on N due to b(1 + N) ¡ c2
2fN + 2d.
This term is always positive
b(1 + N) ¡
c2
2f





@N < 0 for all N > 0.
Case 3: f < c2
2b
Then b ¡ c2
2f < 0 and the sign of @¼
@N depends on N due to the term b(1 + N) ¡
c2
2fN + 2d.






The slope of b(1 + N) ¡ c2
2fN + 2d with respect to N is












Proof of Proposition 9
Firstly, we calculate the consumer surplus
CS = (A + cY ¡ p)X0:5 = 0:5bX2:
35The total surplus is the sum of the ¯rms' pro¯ts and the consumers' surplus












= A2bN(d + c2
4f) + (b + d ¡ c2
4f)(b + :5c2
f N + 2d)
(b(1 + N) ¡ :5c2
f N + 2d)3 > 0:
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